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TAXATION
GEORGE A. LUSCOMBE II*
THE COURT OF Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the past year has
decided tax cases covering a broad spectrum of federal income taxation
law, substantive and procedural, civil and criminal. This article will
discuss those decisions which are most significant or interesting from
the viewpoint of the attorney practicing federal tax law. The discus-
sion does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the issues dis-
cussed, but hopefully presents the issues in a manner useful to the at-
torney desiring a review of the tax decisions of the Seventh Circuit.
RECEIPT OF AN INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP
PROFITS FOR SERVICES
Under section 721 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 the
receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for the contribution of
property is a nontaxable event. However, the Treasury Regulations
provide, in part, as follows:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his right
to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a share in
partnership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation
for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does
not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership capital so
transferred to a partner as compensation -for services constitutes in-
come to the partner under section 61.2
Thus, if an interest in partnership capital is received for the perform-
ance of services, the fair market value of the capital interest is taxable
to the recipient-partner as compensation.3
Based, in part, on the parenthetical in the above-quoted material
from the Treasury Regulations, it has been assumed by tax practition-
ers and scholars that the receipt of an interest in partnership profits,
* Associated with the firm Mayer, Brown and Platt; member of the Illinois and
District of Columbia Bars; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law; L.L.M., George
Washington University.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 721.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
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rather than an interest in capital, in exchange for the performance of
services would not give rise to taxable income to the recipient-partner.
The recipient-partner would have a zero tax basis in his partnership
interest4 and would be taxed on his allocable share of the partnership
profits as earned by the partnership.
5
In Sol Diamond v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,6 the Sev-
enth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, 7 held that the receipt of an inter-
est in partnership profits was taxable as compensation in an amount
equal to the fair market value of the partnership interest at the time
received. In Diamond, one Kargman asked Diamond, a mortgage
broker, to obtain a mortgage loan for the $1,100,000 purchase price
of an office building which Kargman had acquired the right to purchase.
Diamond and Kargman agreed that if Diamond succeeded in obtaining
financing he would receive a 60 percent share of profit or loss on the
venture. Diamond obtained the necessary financing, and on December
15, 1961, the two entered into an agreement providing that:
(1) They were associated as joint venturors for 24 years (the
life of the mortgage) unless earlier terminated;
(2) Kargman was to advance all cash needed for the purchase
in addition to the loan proceeds;
(3) Diamond and Kargman would share profits and losses
60% to 40%;
(4) In the event of the sale of the building, the net proceeds
would be used to repay Kargman amounts supplied by him and 'the
remainder divided in a 60:40 ratio between Diamond and Kargman.
Closing occurred on February 18, 1962, with Kargman putting up
$78,195.13. Shortly after closing, it was proposed that Diamond would
sell his interest. Diamond sold his interest to one Liederman on March
8, 1962, for $40,000.
Diamond argued that the receipt of the interest in partnership
profits was tax free under section 721 and the above-quoted provision
of the regulations, even though received for the performance of ser-
vices. He argued further that the receipt of the $40,000 was taxable
4. Id. § 722.
5. Id. §§ 702, 704.
6. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
7. Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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as short-term capital gain as proceeds on the sale of a partnership in-
terest.
8
The court found that the provision of the regulations was not in-
tended to be all inclusive, but only dealt with .the tax consequences of
the receipt of an interest in partnership capital in exchange for the per-
formance of services. The court reviewed the commentators, the very
limited judicial authority,9 the legislative history, and the lack of prior
administrative interpretations. The court then concluded that where
an interest in partnership profits which had a determinable market
value is received for services, that value should be taxable as compen-
sation.
This decision has resulted in a great deal of consternation in the
tax bar. Until the decisions of the Tax Court and Seventh Circuit in
the Sol Diamond case, it had uniformly been assumed that the receipt
of an interest in partnership profits would be tax free. This decision
is particularly troublesome in light of section 83,10 added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969.11 Section 83 provides, in general, that if property
is transferred in connection with the performance of services, the fair
market value is taxable at the time of transfer if the property is either
transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The pro-
posed regulations under section 83 define the term "property" to in-
clude "both realty and personalty other than money and other than an
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation."'"
Thus, it appears that an interest in partnership profits is viewed by the
IRS as "property" for purposes of section 83.
If a partner holding only an interest in partnership profits is taxed
when he receives that interest, the transaction would be viewed as the
receipt of cash equal to the market value of the partnership interest
and the contribution of that cash in exchange for the partnership inter-
est. Thus, the partner would acquire a tax basis in his partnership in-
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 741.
9. In Herman M. Hale, 24 T.C.M. 1497, 1502 (1965), the Tax Court stated: "Un-
der the regulations, the mere receipt of a partnership interest in future profits does not
create any tax liability. Sec. 1.721-1(b), Income Tax Regs." There was no explanation
by the Tax Court as to how it derived this conclusion from the cited provision of the
regulations, quoted note 2, supra and accompanying text.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83.
11. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321, 83 Stat. 487, 588 (1969).
12. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971). In the same
notice of proposed rule making, the Treasury proposed an amendment to § 1.721-1
(b)(1) to provide that a transfer of an interest in partnership capital is subject to the
rules of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
terest equal to the value of that partnership interest."3 The partner
would be taxed on his allocable share of the partnership income when
earned by the partnership. 4 Thus, he would be taxed on the partner-
ship profits twice to the extent of the value when he receives the inter-
est-once when he receives the partnership interest, and again when
the partnership earns the income.' 5 When the partnership terminates,
presumably the partner would be entitled to a loss deduction for 'the
basis in his partnership interest.' 6 This deduction, however, would
only occur after the double taxation has occurred, thereby compound-
ing the effect of the double taxation.
If, as Diamond did here, a partner sells his partnership interest
immediately after acquiring it, he would realize no gain because his
tax basis would be equal to the amount received on the sale. The pur-
chaser would be taxed on his allocable share of partnership profits and
at the termination of the partnership presumably would be allowed a
deduction for his cost of the partnership interest.
Further, it may be impossible to value the future profits which the
partnership may generate. Any value placed on the interest in future
profits may be purely speculative. In Sol Diamond, however, the
partnership was formed after Diamond had obtained financing. Thus,
the income-earning ability of the partnership could be determined with
reasonable accuracy. Also, Diamond sold his profits interest within a
month after the purchase of the office building. Using these facts, -the
court could value the interest and include it as taxable compensation.
The result in this case may have been different if the partnership were
formed before Diamond commenced efforts to obtain financing, or if
Diamond had not sold his interest (at least not immediately following
the purchase of the office building). In these situations, it may have
been impossible to establish a fair market value.
With regard to the above practical problems, the court of appeals
noted that the Treasury should provide regulations in order to achieve
certainty in the area. It remains to be seen what position the IRS will
take and whether Sol Diamond will be extended beyond its facts to any
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 722.
14. Id. § 702.
15. See, A. WILLIS, WILLIS ON PARTNERSMP TAXATION 84-85 (1971).
16. It is not clear whether the loss would be an ordinary loss or a capital loss.
See, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 165, 731(a), 741; Edward H. Pietz, 59 T.C. 207
(1972).
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receipt of an interest in partnership profits whether for the perform-
ance of past, present, or future services.'
7
BUSINESS EXPENSES
In Fischer v. United States,18 the -taxpayer was an officer-share-
holder of a corporation. Pursuant to settlement of a dispute between
the corporation and holders of its convertible debentures, and in order
to induce the debenture holders to enter into the settlement, the tax-
payer sold a portion of his shares in the company to the debenture hold-
ers for $4.20 per share at a time when the shares had a market value
of $16.625. The taxpayer was aware that his resignation from the
board of directors would be demanded if the dispute were not settled.
He also thought that the resulting publicity would adversely affect his
business reputation and jeopardize his future as a corporate executive,
as well as adversely affect the value of the taxpayer's stock in the com-
pany. If the debenture holders had prevailed in the dispute the value
of the stock would have been adversely affected.
The taxpayer argued that the difference between the market
value of the stock and what he sold it for should be deductible as a
business expense.' 9 The government conceded that for tax purposes
a salaried corporate officer is engaged in a trade or business separate
and distinct from that of his corporation-the business of rendering ser-
vices for compensation. Following the reasoning of a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,2" the Seventh
Circuit held that the difference between the selling price and market
value of the stock was not a deductible business expense because it
was the corporation's, not the taxpayer's, obligation that was being dis-
charged. This was the case even -though the taxpayer, in his own mind,
might have felt compelled to participate in the settlement agreement.
The taxpayer also argued that the amounts were deductible to
protect his investment in the stock. 21 The court held that the origin
17. For a penetrating analysis of the Sol Diamond case, see Cowan, Receipt of an
Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case, 27
TAX L. REV. 161 (1972).
18. 490 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1973).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
20. Noland v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1959), where the court stated,
in part, that "[t]hough the individual stockholder-executive, in his own mind, may iden-
tify his interests and business with those of the corporation, they legally are distinct,
and, ordinarily, if he voluntarily pays or guarantees the corporation's obligations, his ex-
pense may not be deducted on his personal return."
21. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2) allows 4 dedction for the ordinary and
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of the claim in settlement of which the taxpayer sold the stock was a
threatened lawsuit arising out of the corporation's financing operation
and not out of the taxpayer's personal stock dealing. The court stated
that section 21222 does not -turn upon the possible consequences of a
claim to the fortunes of the taxpayer. 23
REASONABLE COMPENSATION
Amounts paid or incurred for compensation are deductible only
if -the amounts are reasonable. 24  The Seventh Circuit, in Edwin's Inc.
v. United States,25 held that as a matter of law contributions to a pen-
sion fund constitute compensation which must be included with salaries
and bonuses (as well as other forms of compensation) in determining
whether compensation paid an employee is reasonable.28
The court also stated that there are situations where owner-em-
ployees could reasonably be paid more as deductible compensation
than an employee who is not an owner but in a similar job. The court
stated that:
The owners of a business, particularly one which they have built
up from scratch, will have the personal incentive not necessarily
shared by hired help, and will devote those extra ounces of energy,
thought, and devotion that will spell not merely the difference be-
tween success and failure but the difference between success and
extraordinary success. 27
In the case of an owner-employee of a closely-held corporation, exces-
sive compensation is generally treated as a dividend taxable as ordinary
income -to the extent of earnings and profits.28
necessary expenses for the management, conservation, or maintenace of property held
for the production of income.
22. Id.
23. In his dissenting opinion, 490 F.2d at 223, (Cummings, J., dissenting), Judge
Cummings raised the prospect (not raised by the government) that, if the taxpayer were
entitled to the deduction, he may have a capital gain in the amount of the excess of
the market value of the stock over the selling price which the government contended
was the taxpayer's basis. See, United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); International Freighting Corp., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1).
25. 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974).
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) provides, in part, that contributions to a
pension plan are not deductible under section 404, unless they satisfy the conditions of
either section 162 or section 212.
27. 501 F.2d at 678 (7th Cir. 1974).
28. TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
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DATE OF SALE
Herbert J. Investment Corp. v. United States29 involved the sale
of a trucking business which required the approval of the Interstate
Commerce Commission." ° On February 26, 1968, taxpayer agreed to
the sale of all its assets to CW Corporation for stock of CW. As part
of the agreement, taxpayer and CW agreed to seek permission from
the ICC for CW to assume temporary control pending final approval.
Such permission was granted on March 26, 1968, and management
control was assumed by CW on April 1, 1968. The April 1, 1968,
date was the valuation date used by -the parties. Final approval by the
ICC with formal exchange of assets and CW stock occurred on August
30, 1968. The value of the CW stock increased substantially between
April 1 and August 30.
The court, affirming the district court,31 held that the April 1 date
was the date of sale and consequently the date on which the proceeds
of the sale-the CW stock-were to be valued. The court found that
the parties intended the April 1 date -to govern, as the benefits and
the risk of ownership were transferred to CW on that date. The dis-
trict court found that -the condition of final approval contained in the
sale agreement was merely a condition subsequent to the sale contract
which would in all likelihood be granted, and that the increase in value
of the CW stock between April 1 and August 30 was probably attribut-
able to the acquisition of taxpayer's trucking business.
BANKRUPTCY
As a general rule, bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdiction
to adjudicate controversies with respect to property in their actual or
constructive possession, but do not have such jurisdiction as to property
not in their possession.32
In United States v. Phelps,3 3 -the court held that the United States
had possession of intangible property under a tax lien even where it
did not yet have actual possession. On August 25, 1971, the IRS filed
a notice of tax lien with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds and
29. 500 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1974).
30. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
31. 360 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Wis. 1973), ajf'd, 500 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1974).
32. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264
U.S. 426 (1924); 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 342(3) (1962).
33. 495 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1974). The case arose under the Bankruptcy Court's
jurisdiction to collect the estates of bankrupts under section 2a(7) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § lla(7) (1970).
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served a notice of levy on the taxpayer's assignee for the benefit of
creditors. On September 14, 1971, an involuntary petition for bank-
ruptcy was filed and a receiver appointed ten days thereafter; the tax-
payer was then adjudged bankrupt on September 28, 1971. The gov-
ernment resisted the receiver's application for an order requiring the
assignee to turn over all the taxpayer's assets.
The court determined that actual possession of intangible property
is not necessary to upgrade the government's tax liens from the sub-
ordinate priority accorded under section 67(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Act,34 and found for the government. Service of notice on the as-
signee, stating that the taxpayer's properties "are hereby levied upon
and seized for satisfaction" of the taxes, is instead sufficient. The
court relied upon section 6331(b) which provides that the term "levy"
includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.35 The
Treasury Regulations provide in part as follows:
Levy may be made by serving a notice of levy on any person in
possession of, or obligated with respect to, property or rights to
property subject to levy including receivables, bank accounts, evi-
dences of debt, securities, and accrued salaries, wages, commissions,
and other compensation. 36
The court also relied upon decisions of the First and Fourth Circuits
involving plenary suits, both of which involved debts owing the bank-
rupt.17  The Seventh Circuit here declined to follow a contrary 1973
holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in which the government served a notice of levy on the person with
whom the taxpayer-bankrupt had factored its accounts receivable. 38
34. 11 U.S.C. § 67(c)(3) (1970), provides:
"(3) Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by posses-
sion shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and(2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title. Where such a tax lien
is prior in right to liens indefeasible in bankruptcy, the court shall order pay-
ment from the proceeds derived from the sale of the personal property to
which the tax lien attaches, less the actual cost of that sale, of an amount
not in excess of the tax lien, to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of
subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title. If the amount realized from the
sale exceeds the total of such debts, after allowing for prior indefeasible liens
and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the amount of the difference between
the total paid to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a)
of section 104 of this title and the amount of the tax lien, is to be paid to the
holder of the tax lien." 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (3) (1974 Supp.).
Section 104(a)(1) and (2) provides, generally, for priority treatment for certain
enumerated debts of administration, etc., of the bankruptcy estate, and for wages and
commissions, not in excess of $600 per claimant, earned within three months of the
commencement of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(1) and (2) (1974
Supp.).
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(b).
36. Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a)(1) (1954).
37. Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1962); United States v.
Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
38. In re United General Wood Prodvcts Corp., 4$3 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973),
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DEFINITION OF "WILLFUL"
The Internal Revenue Code provides criminal penalties for will-
fully attempting to evade or defeat any tax imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code,39 and for willfully failing to perform certain acts, in-
cluding the filing of income tax returns.40 The former is a felony while
the latter is a misdemeanor. After a great deal of controversy concern-
ing whether a different test of scienter was intended between sections
7201 and 7203, the United States Supreme Court decided in 1973 that
the term "willfully" has the same meaning in both provisions. 41 In
United States v. Bishop, the Supreme Court held that willfully contem-
plates "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty", and
that proof of willfullness required a demonstration of "bad faith or evil
intent" or "evil motive and want of justification in view of all the finan-
cial circumstances of the taxpayer."42
In United States v. McCorkle,4 the Seventh Circuit reversed the
conviction of the taxpayer for willfully failing to file tax returns, in part,
because the trial judge's charge to the jury was not consistent with the
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Bishop.44 The trial
judge had instructed the jury that all the government was required to
prove was that the defendant intended not to file tax returns, explicitly
instructing the jury that it need not consider whether the defendant
intended to defraud the Government. The court also found the in-
structions deficient because they eliminated justifiable excuse as -a con-
sideration in determining whether the defendant willfully failed to file
returns. The court rejected a government contention that the jury in-
structions were proper when taken as a whole because certain of the
instructions correctly described the element of willfullness.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The Treasury Regulations45 provide that the amount of discount
on a bond issued by a corporation on or before May 27, 1969,46 should
39. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
40. Id. § 7203.
41. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
42. Id. at 360.
43. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9347 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. It should be noted that the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bishop after
the conviction of the defendant in McCorkle.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(a)(1) (1968).
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-4 (1971), for rules relating to the deduction of bond
discount on bonds issued after May 27, 1969.
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be amortized over the life of the bond. The regulations also allow an
amortization deduction for discount on bonds issued after December
31, 1954, and before December 24, 1968, as part of investment units
consisting of obligations and options, but only beginning with the first
taxable year ending on or after December 24, 1968. The amortization
period is the remaining life of the bonds. 7  Thus, the discount on such
a bond issued as part of investment units consisting of obligations and
options may be deducted in full in the form of amortization over the
remaining life of the bonds, if the bonds were still outstanding in the
issuer-corporation's first taxable year ending on or after December 24,
1968. However, if the bonds had been called or retired before the first
taxable year ending on or after December 24, 1968, no deduction would
be allowed for discount on such bonds.
The taxpayer in Danly Machine Corp. v. United States s argued
that the Secretary of the Treasury abused his statutory authority49 by
not allowing a comparable deduction to corporations which had issued
similar obligations, but which at the time the regulation was adopted
no longer had the obligations outstanding. The court stated that, if
it found that the regulation was arbitrary and a misapplication of stat-
utory authority, the only power it had would be to nullify the regula-
tion. Thus, the court could not allow a deduction to the taxpayer, but
could only deny deductions to corporations covered by the regulation.
The court then proceeded to find the regulation to be a valid exercise
of the Secretary's authority under section 7805.50 The court stated that
it will take a generous view of the discretion allowed to the Secretary,5
and it is less willing .to see an abuse of discretion where the Secretary
exercises the ample powers available under section 7805. Thus, it
would seem to be extremely difficult in the Seventh Circuit to overturn
a regulation because of the failure of the Treasury to give a regulation
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(a)(2) (1968).
48. 492 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b), the Secretary is authorized to pre-
scribe the extent, if any, to which any regulation shall be applied without retroactive
effect.
50. Id.
51. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently overturned
a Treasury Regulation in an unrelated area because the discretion granted under Sec-
tion 7805(b) was abused. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d
406 (4th Cir. 1973). The Seventh Circuit noted in Danly Machine that it could distin-
guish the Fourth Circuit case since the regulation there involved drew a line which
"seems to have been nearly if not quite irrational from any point of principle, policy,
or pragmatism" but did not do so since it took a "more generous view" than the Fourth
Circuit of the discretion granted under section 7805(b). 492 F.2d at 34.
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retroactive effect.
FAILURE TO DEPOSIT WITHHOLDING TAXES
In affirming the conviction of the defendant for failing, after no-
notice, to deposit taxes withheld from employees52 in a special bank ac-
count in trust for the Government, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that he was being imprisoned for debt because he was unable
to pay the taxes." The court followed a recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which stated:
The argument that he is being imprisoned for debt is specious.
Patterson's misdemeanor was using as his own the tax money he
was required by law to withhold from his workmen's wages and
to pay over to the government. Congress had adequate power to
punish such conduct.54
The Seventh Circuit in Gorden then stated that to avoid criminal penal-
ties the defendant could have gone out of business, or could have bor-
rowed the money to pay the employee's wages and to deposit the with-
holding taxes, or could have paid the withholding taxes instead of other
creditors.
The court also held that it is immaterial that section 7215 does
not require willfullness to sustain a conviction because the statute pro-
vides adequate safeguards which must be mnt before a defendant cai.
be convicted under that provision.55
ESTOPPEL
The Internal Revenue Code provides two statutory provisions for
the administrative settlement of tax liability. Under section 7121,56
the Secretary or his delegate is authorized to enter into a written agree-
ment which shall be final and conclusive in any suit or proceeding, ex-
cept upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresentation of
a material fact. Section 7122" authorizes the Secretary or his delegate
52. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7215, 7512.
53. United States v. Gorden, 495 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed
May 20, 1974.
54. United States v. Patterson, 465 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1038 (1974).
55. Under section 7512(a) (2), notice must be hand-delivered. Under section
7215(b), guilt does not attach if the defendant can show there was reasonable doubt
whether the law required collection of the tax or who was required by law to collect
the tax, or if the defendant can show that failure to comply was due to circumstances
beyond his control.
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7121.
57. Id. § 7122.
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to compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal
revenue laws prior to referral of the case to the Department of Justice
for prosecution or defense. The Treasury Regulations provide that a
case can be compromised only if there is doubt as to liability and/or
collectibility.18
These statutory provisions, however, are not always used to settle
cases because, among other reasons, the number of cases do not make
it possible to have the designated officers approve every proposed
agreement, due to the delay between -the receipt of an offer and ulti-
mate action by the IRS.5 9 Instead, nonstatutory methods have been
used by the IRS to settle cases. Form 870-AD (Offer of Waiver of
Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and
of Acceptance of Overassessment) is used by the Apellate Division to
effect a settlement without using a statutory closing agreement. That
form recites the taxpayer's offer to waive the statutory restrictions on
assessment and collection,6 ° the taxpayer's consent to the assessment
and collection of the deficiencies specified, and acceptance of the over-
assessments as correct, so that after acceptance by or on behalf of the
Commissioner the case cannot be reopened absent fraud or serious
mistake in mathematical calculation. Further, the Form provides that
no claim for refund or credit may be filed for the years stated. The
form itself also provides that execution of the form is not a final closing
agreement under section 7121, and does not extend the statute of limita-
tions for refund, assessment, or collection of the tax.
There has been much litigation over the question of whether the
execution of a nonstatutory agreement, such as Form 870-AD, bars
a taxpayer from bringing a subsequent suit for a refund of the taxes
paid pursuant to the agreement. In the leading case (which involved
a nonstatutory settlement agreement not on Form 870-AD) on the
question,6' the Supreme Court held that the statute prescribing meth-
ods by which cases could be settled must be strictly complied with.
Under the statute involved in that case only the Commissioner, with
the advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, could compro-
mise tax suits.8 2  The government argued that the taxpayer entered
58. Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(a) (1960).
59. See, Gutkin, Informal Federal Tax Settlements and Their Binding Effect, 4
TAx L. REv. 477 (1949).
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
61. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
62. Id. at 286 n.5.
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into an agreement and was enjoying the benefits of concessions granted
by the government as a part of that agreement. It was not stated
whether or not the government could assess a deficiency or whether
the statute of limitations had run.63 The Court stated:
[W]ithout determining whether such an agreement, though not
binding in itself, may when executed become, under some circum-
stances, binding on the parties by estoppel, it suffices to say that
here the findings disclose no adequate ground for any claim of es-
toppel by the United States.6 4'
Since the Supreme Court's decision, the cases have not been consistent
regarding the question of under what circumstances, if any, a settle-
ment agreement not executed in accordance with the statutory provi-
sions would be binding on the taxpayer and the government by estop-
pel. 65
The Seventh Circuit had occasion to address this question in
Bennett v. United States.66 In that case the agreement recited that
it was subject to acceptance by, or on behalf of, the Commissioner and
if not accepted the agreement would have no effect. It also stated that
the taxpayer agreed to execute at any time, upon request of the Com-
missioner, a final agreement under the provisions of section 3760 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. There was no showing by the
government that the officer who entered into the agreement had the
authority to close out the matters described in the waiver of restric-
tions. The court held that the taxpayer was not estopped because
under the agreement the ability to comply with the closing agreement
statutory provisions was solely within the government, and that the
government therefore knew that the statute of limitations applicable to
assessment of deficiencies might expire. The court held that, since
the applicable statutory provision under the Internal Revenue Code
of 193967 required action by the Commissioner or by some officer or
employee expressly authorized by the Commissioner, nothing short of
action by the Commissioner would satisfy the exclusive statutory method
for formalizing a settlement agreement.
The Seventh Circuit recently had occasion to examine the question
63. The court in General Split Corp. v. United States, 500 F.2d 998 (7th Cir.
1974), pointed out that it appears that the statute of limitations for assessment of de-
ficiencies had expired.
64. 278 U.S. at 289.
65. For a collection of cases on this question see Uinta Livestock Corp. v. United
States, 355 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1966); 9 MEaRTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOMB TAXATION
§ 52.07 (1971); Gutkin, supra note 59.
66. 231 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1956).
07. INT. REV. GODL OF 1939, § 3760? 53 Stat, 462,
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again. 8 The taxpayer and the IRS executed a settlement agreement
on Form 870-AD. The taxpayer then filed suit in the district court
for refund of taxes paid. The IRS had disallowed interest deductions
on certain loans on the ground that the advances were not true loans
but equity capital. While the subsequent Tax Court case was pending,
the taxpayer and the IRS negotiated a settlement of the asserted
deficiencies. The settlement agreement was evidenced by a stipulated
Tax Court decision, which became final,"9 effecting a 20 percent disal-
lowance of the claimed interest deductions for taxable years 1962,
1963, and 1964; a "collateral agreement" providing for a 20 percent
disallowance of -the claimed interest deductions for 1965 and 1966 and
providing that, as additional consideration for the acceptance of this
agreement, the taxpayer agreed not to claim interest deductions on the
loan in future years; and the execution of a Form 870-AD for the latter
years which effected a 20 percent disallowance of the interest deduc-
tions with respect to one loan and a 100 percent disallowance of the
interest deductions on others. The court affirmed the granting of sum-
mary judgment by the district court on the theory that the taxpayer was
estopped from bringing the action because of the settlement agreement
on which the government relied to its detriment.70
In this case however, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Bennett71
and held -that the taxpayer was estopped from bringing a suit for re-
fund. In the present case, the settlement package contained a stipu-
lated Tax Court decision which had become final and could not be set
aside or reviewed. At that point, there was no equitable way to undo
the portion of the settlement reflected in the Form 870-AD. The
Form 870-AD and the stipulated Tax Court decision were related parts
of the settlement agreement.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit will bar a suit for refund on estoppel
grounds in an appropriate situation where the Government is itself
barred by a finalized stipulated court decision from assessing further
deficiencies. It would appear that, based on the Bennett decision, the
court would not bar a refund suit in a situation where the Government,
in reliance on the settlement agreement, allowed the statute of limita-
tions for assessment of deficiences to expire, because the Government
could have protected itself by causing a formal closing agreement to
68. General Split Corp. v. United States, 500 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974).
69. Irrr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7481, 7483.
70. 363 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1973), aft'd, 500 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974).
71. 231 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1956).
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be executed. But, in Genreral Split Corp. the Government, it would
seem, could also have protected itself by means of a formal closing
agreement under section 7121. It is interesting to note that the Gov-
ernment, in the district court, conceded that Form 870-AD does not
in itself preclude a subsequent suit for refund.
In Howard v. United States,72 taxpayers claimed a theft loss on
their 1965 federal income tax return.73  The return was audited by
the IRS and the theft loss was not disallowed. Taxpayers then sought
to carry the theft loss back to secure refunds for taxes paid for the years
1962 and 1963 on the ground that the 1965 theft loss created a net
operating loss carryback.7 4  Upon audit, the IRS denied the refund on
the grounds that the 1965 loss was not a theft loss but rather a non-
business bad debt 75 which cannot constitute a net operating loss. 7 6
Taxpayer argued that the Government was estopped to deny the refund
because it had not disallowed the loss as a result of the audit of the
1965 tax return. The court held, citing numerous authorities, that
even if the IRS review of the 1965 return constituted an approval of
the claimed theft loss, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not appli-
cable because, under that doctrine, only judicial decisions are given con-
clusive effect in subsequent proceedings. A determination by the IRS
is not judicial in nature, but only administrative.
ENFORCEMENT OF SUMMONS
In United States v. Awerkamp,77 a revenue officer in the Collec-
tion Division of the IRS issued a summons to Awerkamp, directing him
to appear before the revenue officer and give testimony relating to his
tax liability or the collection of his tax liability and to bring with him
all documents and records in his possession or control which are neces-
sary to enable the IRS to complete a federal income tax return for tax-
able years 1970 and 1971. Upon Awerkamp's failure to testify or sub-
mit records, the revenue officer petitioned the district court for en-
forcement of the summons. 78  Over Awerkamp's assertions that sec-
tions 7402(a), 7602, and 7604(a) violated -the fourth, fifth, and thir-
teenth amendments to the Constitution, the court ordered Awerkamp
72. 497 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1974).
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
74. Id. § 172.
75. Id. § 166.
76. Id. § 172(d).
77. 497 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1974).
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
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to appear and give testimony concerning his federal income tax
returns.
In affirming the unreported decision of the district court which
enforced the summons, the Seventh Circuit stated that the information
sought by the summons was to be used for the completion of tax returns
for 1970 and 1971. The agent was not a special agent with the Intel-
ligence Division, but was in the Collection Division. There was noth-
ing to indicate that a recommendation for prosecution had been
made.7" The court stated further than the mere possibility of criminal
prosecution does not make the summons unenforceable.
Citing its earlier decision in United States v. Dickerson,"° the court
held that the Miranda81 warning need not be given a taxpayer until
the first contaot with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred
to the Intelligence Division. 2  The Seventh Circuit is a maverick
among the courts of appeal on the application of Miranda in tax investi-
gations. The prevailing view is that Miranda warnings are not consti-
tutionally required in tax investigations where the taxpayer is not
deprived of his freedom and is not actually compelled or coerced to
furnish statements or documents. 3
The IRS has required special agents to give a Miranda-type warn-
ing to taxpayers at the first interview.8 4  The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the IRC is required to com-
ply with its own rule in tax investigations occurring after the inception
of its requirement for special agents.8 5
The court stated that the proper manner in which the taxpayer
should raise his Constitutional objections is to appear before the agent
79. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
80. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
82. This is generally indicated by the presence of an IRS Special Agent.
83. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 400
U.S. 831 (1970); Taglianelli v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1969); aff'd, 394
U.S. 316 (1969) (the Court did not discuss this question); United States v. White, 417
F.2d 89 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); United States v. Jaskiewicz,
433 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Bag-
dasion, 398 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.
1967); Muse v. United States, 405 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chikata,
427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1970); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1969).
84. IRS News Release IR-897 (October 3, 1967); IRS News Release IR-949 (No-
vember 26, 1968); CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. If 5709.1148.
85. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit
has held that substantial compliance with the IRS procedure is all that is required,
United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1327 (1973)
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and raise objections as specific questions are asked.8 6
In United States v. Joyce,87 another case involving a summons, the
court reversed the judgment of the district court holding the defendant
in contempt for failing to produce certain records and documents re-
lating to the federal tax liability of a foreign corporation. The district
court ordered the defendant to use his "best offices" to obtain the re-
quested records. The Seventh Circuit held that this order was not
clear and specific and did not give the defendant sufficient direction
as to how he was to proceed to try to obtain the records, which he
had stated under oath that he did not have in his possession. The court
found that the defendant had done everything in his power to try to
obtain the records. Citing the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Brepan,8 8 the court stated that a witness could not be held in con-
tempt for failure to produce documents not in his possession, unless
he is responsible for them or he is impeding justice by not explaining
what happened to them.
Citing its earlier opinion in United States v. Hayes, 9 the court also
held that a claim that the foreign corporation is exempt from federal
income tax will not defeat a proper inquiry or the use of summonses
by the IRS to seek information that is relevant to the determination
of tax liability.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
In Epperson v. United States,90 -the taxpayer argued on appeal that
the finding of a district court jury that he owed deficiencies should be
reversed. One of the arguments the taxpayer raised on appeal was
that the jury was inflamed by the closing argument of counsel for the
Government in which counsel said:
We see no reason why a man who has as much money as Dr. Ep-
person, who has more money than he can probably ever spend, is
entitled to ignore all the rules that everybody else has to live by
... . We say he is not entitled to a refund of taxes because he
hasn't paid his fair share. . . . Let's make this doctor pay the
kind of income taxes he ought to pay. . . . I am sick and tired
and I know you are at having to pay taxes at a rate when these
86. See Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), where the Supreme Court
held that the fifth amendment protection does not excuse a failure to file an income
tax return. The taxpayer can raise objections to specific questions asked on the return.
87. 498 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1974).
88. 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
89. 408 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1969).
90. 490 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1973),
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rich people like to construe and set up all these transactions to save
taxes so they don't have to pay any.91
Counsel for the Government also made reference to the taxpayer pay-
ing only eight percent taxes and stated: "I guarantee you, every one
of you, pay taxes far in excess of eight percent"; and "if he doesn't
[pay his fair share] somebody else is going to have to do it for him."92
The court held that, although the above statements of counsel
were in bad taste if not reprehensible, the verdict should not be re-
versed because taxpayer's counsel did not request an admonition of the
jury and did not movYe for a mistrial, and because in the context of the
entire argument the taxpayer was not denied a fair trial in view of the
record as a whole.
Judge Pell, in a strong dissent, 93 stated that the verdict should be
reversed because an official representative of the Government was in
effect saying that tax avoidance was egregious conduct which should
be penalized for its own sake. The statements, in Judge Pen's opinion,
could not help but influence the jury.
It appears that the Government counsel was not drawing a line
between tax evasion, which is not permissible, and tax avoidance,
which is. The Government counsel was indeed, it would seem, telling
the jury that the taxpayer should be held liable to pay more taxes be-
cause he, if nothing more, had arranged his affairs in such a way as to
minimize his taxes under the law.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, perhaps the most significant decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with partnerships and whether
a settlement agreement on Form 870-AD prevents a suit for refund.
It will be interesting to see the effect of these decisions in future cases.
91. Id. at 100.
92. Id. at 101, 102.
93. Id. at 101 (Pell, J., dissenting).
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